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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
No. 8994 
SPANISH FoRK WEsT FIELD IRRIGATION CoMPANY, A CoRPORA-
TION, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS 
v. 
THE UNITED STATES, A NATION, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND 
APPELLANTS 
APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS, THE UNITED ST~TES, THE SECRE-
TARY OF THE INTERIOR, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF 
RECLAMATION 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Strawberry Valley Irrigation Project is a rec:lamation 
project of the United States, built and operated under and in 
pursuance of the Reclamation Act of 1902 (32: Stat. 388) and 
acts supplemental thereto. Construction of the project by the 
United States began in about the year 1907 (Fdg. 22) and 
irrigation water was first declared to be available under the 
project by public notice dated October 8, 1915 (Def. Ex. 50). 
The project serves lands in the southerly part of Utah County, 
Utah. Its principal features include the Strawberry Valley 
Reservoir, located in Wasatch County, Utah, and the High 
Line and Springville-Mapleton Canals. 
Most of the project water supply is obtained by trans-moun-
tain diversion from the Colorado River system and the water 
so obtained is stored in the Strawberry Valley Reservoir (Fdgs. 
22, 51). Released from there as need arises during the irriga-
tion season, this water pours through a tunnel in the Wasatch 
(1) 
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Mountains and into the Diamond Fork of the Spanish Fork 
River. From that river, it is diverted at several points for the 
ultimate use by irrigators and other water users who have con-
tracted with the United States for the delivery of water. In 
furtherance of the project plan, the United States filed upon 
and acquired the right to use the waters so stored in the Straw-
berry Valley Reservoir (Fdg. 22). 
By applications filed in 1909 and 1914, the United States also 
acquired under the law of Utah appropriative rights to use 
for irrigation of lands within the project 390 cubic feet per 
second of the natural flow of Spanish Fork River (Fdgs. 22, 24, 
25). Water available under these rights comprises the second 
component of the project supply.1 
Insofar as this case is concerned, the project includes two 
types of water users. The plaintiff type are the users under 
appropriative rights to use natural flow of the Spanish Fork 
River which were acquired independently of the appropriations 
made by the United States. Consequently, these users irrigate 
with "river" water obtained under those rights during the 
spring months when such water is available, and their only 
demand upon the project water supply is for stored water after 
the early river flow has subsided. Their lands are served with 
both "river" water and stored water through the works of the 
plaintiff canal and irrigation companies and some of the de-
fendant companies similarly situated which did not join as 
plaintiffs.2 
1 The United States also has a right under an appropriation of 1906 to 
use 156 cubic feet per second of the :flow of Spanish Fork River for power 
purposes ( Fdg. 23). It is deemed unnecessary further to consider that 
right for the purposes of this appeal. 
~The trial court determined that the appropriative rights of all these 
companies in the natural :flow of the Spanish Fork River, aggregating 390 
cubic feet per second, are prior in time to the appropriatiw rights of the 
United States from the same source (Decree. pars. 5-9). ·whether or not 
that is correct is not a matter of moment in the consideration of this 
appeal as, in our view, the decree must be set aside for lack of jurisdiction 
in the Court below rto render it. It iJS sufficient to obserw here that no 
complaint is made in the petition that the appropriati>e rights of those com-
paniP~ have been injured by anyone, including the United States, and the 
petition does not seek a declarartion of the relative priorities of the com-
panies and the United States. That is not what this case is about, as 
appears more particularly below. 
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The defendant-type users receive their entire water require-
ments from the project supply, the deliveries to them consist-
ing of "river" water within the United States' appropriations so 
long as it is available, and thereafter of stored water. All of 
the lands belonging to users of this type are under the High 
·Line and Springville-Mapleton Canals. 
"Most" of the water right application contracts between the 
United States and the defendant-type users provide for delivery 
of that quantity of project water which shall be beneficially 
used on the lands referred to in the applications, not to exceed 
a specified number of acre feet per acre (Fdg. 30). A typical 
provision of those contracts is quoted in Finding 30 as follows: 
The quantitive measure of the water right hereby ap-
plied for is that quantity of water which shall be benefi-
cially used for the irrigation of said irrigable land up to, 
but not exceeding two (2) acre feet per acre per annum, 
measured at the head of the Strawberry High Line Ca;. 
nal, and in no case exceeding the share proportionate to 
irrigable acreage, of the water supply actually available 
as determined by the Project Manager or other proper 
officer of the United States, or its successor in the con-
trol of the project, during the irrigation season for the 
irrigation of lands under said unit. The applicant as-
sumes all risk of loss in transporting the water from the 
point of delivery to the said land. 
Although in the course of development of the project at least 
nine different forms of water-right applieations were used, in-
cluding the contracts with the plaintiff-type users, the trial 
court found that as to every such contract for project water, it 
was intended that in case the total supply of water available in 
any year should be insufficient "to fully supply all applicants, 
then the supply available should be prorated in proportion to 
the acre feet subscribed for by the holders of applications ap-
proved and then in good standing" (Fdg. 45). "The majority" 
of such contracts "specify a. period of delivery of water from 
May 1st to September 30th, while some specify the irrigation 
season, and others contain no recital as to the time of delivery" 
(Fdg. 45). 
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The defendant Strawberry Water Users' Association was 
incorporated in 1922 (Fdg. 33) for the purpose of operating 
the project (Plf. Ex. 13). Pursuant to request by the Associa-
tion of the Secretary of the Interior, the United States, acting 
by and through the Secretary, and in pursuance of subsection 
G of Section 4 of the Act of December 5, 1924 (43 Stat. 702), 
entered into a contract on September 28, 1926, whereby "the 
care, operation and maintenance of the entire" project "except 
the Mapleton and Springville lateral [canal] and the High 
Line Canal" were transferred to the Association.3 The transfer 
was made "subject to the terms of all existing contracts" and 
the contract provided for retention of title to all property in 
the Government (Plf. Ex. 11, Article 11; Fdg. 33). The Asso-
ciation obligated itself to operate the project "in full compli-
ance with the reclamation law as it now exists (and as it may 
hereafter be amended), the regulations of the Secretary now 
and hereafter made thereunder, and the terms of this con-
tract. * * *" These terms still govern management of the 
project by the Association (Def. Ex. 49, Articles 14, 23; Fdg. 
33), although the original contract was amended by later con-
tracts dated November 20, 1928 (Def. Ex. 48) and October 9, 
1940 (Def. Ex. 49; Fdg. 33). 
For many years it has been the practice of the Association 
to provide that use by the defendant-type users of early "river" 
water should be charged only in part against their respective 
contract entitlements (Fdg. 43). A reason for this practice 
has been that, because stored water delivered after the early 
river flow has subsided is n1ore valuable to the irrigators (Fdg. 
48), the defendant-type users would not use all the "river" 
water when it is available if such water were fully charged to 
their contract entitle1nents and a portion of the "river" water 
would as a result be lost to the project (Fdg. 49). 
It is this practice in a.d1ninistration of the project water sup-
ply which is the sole subject of controversy in this suit. The 
plaintiff-type users being so situated as not to receive any ap-
parent direct benefits therefr01n, this suit was initiated under 
11 The car(', operation and maintenance of the High Line and Sprineo-ville-
Mapleton Canals had been previously transferred to other organizations 
(Fdgs. 32, 34-, 35; Plf. Exs.lO and 15). 
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the Utah Declaratory Judgment Act late in December, '1'954. 
The plaintiffs purport to represent all plaintiff-type users and 
they sue the defendants as representatives of all defendant-type 
users. The relief prayed for, so far as it need be considered for 
the purposes of this appeal, was a determination ( 1) that all 
water right applicants under the project should be charged in 
full with all the water they receive, whether "river" water or 
stored water, and (2) that all parties should be limited to the 
quantities of water specified in their respective contracts with 
the United States, except as they may show some other or addi-
tional water right. The injury which plaintiffs assert is that 
the practice complained of diminishes the supply of stored 
water beyond the extent to which it would be diminished if the 
defendant-type water users were charged in full for their use 
of river water, thereby requiring plaintiff-type users to accept 
pro rata reductions of their contract entitlements in years 
when water in storage is insufficient to meet all project needs. 
Motions to dismiss and to quash service of process were filed 
on behalf of the United States, the Secretary of the Interior 
and the Commissioner of Recla1na tion. These motions were 
denied and thereafter a petition for an interlocutory appeal was 
denied by this Court on October 3, 1955. Defendants, the 
United States, the Secretary of the Interior and the Commis.-
sioner of Reclamation, "without submitting to the jurisdiction" 
of the Court below, then answered. Trial of the cause was had 
during January, 1957, and the Court below entered its findings 
of fact, conclusions of law, and decree on March 12, 1958. Mo-
tion for a new trial made by the United States, the Secretary of 
the Interior and the Commissioner of Recla1nation, in which 
motion certain of the other defendants joined, was denied on 
November 22, 1958. Notice of appeal to this Court from the 
judgment of the trial court and from the order denying the mo-
tion for new trial were timely filed by the United States, the 
Secretary of the Interior, and the Commissioner of Reclama-
tion. All other parties have likewise appealed. 
In its determination of the case, the trial court went far be-
yond plaintiffs' request for a determination that all water used 
should be charged to the respective contract entitlements and 
that all users should be limited to their respective contract 
5.06.8.5.6---5.9-2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
v 
rights except as they might show some other or additional right. 
After gratuitously determining, aliunde the pleadings, that the 
rights of the United States in the natural flow of the Spanish 
Fork River are junior to such rights of Spanish Fork City and 
the canal and irrigation companies which carry project water to 
the plaintiff-type users, and enjoining "the United States, its 
agents and successors in title and interest" from interfering 
with the latter rights (Decree, par. 11), the decree then quiets 
"in the United States and its successors in interest and title" 
title to the appropriate rights of the United States "to the flow 
of the Spanish Fork River to the extent of 390 cubic feet per 
second during the period extending from March 1st to N ovem-
ber 1st of each year" and to the "rights to the use of the water 
stored and to be stored in the Strawberry Reservoir" (Decree, 
par. 12). The Court then, having concluded that the Water 
Users' Association "in its management and operation of the 
Strawberry Project, does not have the right to allow diversion 
of water from the river without charging the user therefor" 
(Conclusion 14) but that the charge to be made need not and 
should not be for the full quantity of river water used (Conclu-
sions 15 and 16), assumed to itself the power to determine the 
proper percentages of charge which should be made on account 
of such uses. Paragraph 13 of the Decree sets forth the trial 
court's judgment of the percentages of charge properly to be 
made under the circumstances therein set forth. By paragraph 
14 of the Decree the State Engineer of Utah is designated as 
the court's agent to estimate each year the project water supply, 
as a predicate for application of the appropriate percentage 
charge prescribed by the preceding paragraph. Paragraph 15 
purports to authorize the \Vater Users' Association to sell ex-
cess river water in years of high water. but prescribes that "no 
sale shall be 1nade for use upon lands covered by presently sub-
sisting subscriptions in the Strawberry reclamation project at 
a cost less than that which ,yjll be connnensurate with the per-
centage charges hereinabove set forth for use of project river 
water." And by paragra.ph 16 jurisdiction is retained for a 
period of ten years for the purpooe "of making changes in the 
percentages of charges to be n1ade for the use of project river 
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water in the event the percentages herein provided for shall be 
found to be inequitable." 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. The Court below had no jurisdiction over the United 
States and could acquire none. As the United States was an 
indispensable party, however, the entire action should have 
been dismissed. 
II. The Court below had no jurisdiction over the Secretary 
of the Interior and could acquire none. As the Secretary was, 
however, an indispensable party, the entire action should have 
been dismissed. 
III. The decree entered is invalid for the following additional 
reasons. It should be set aside and the Court below directed to 
dismiss the action. 
(a) The Court below has promulgated a legislative regula-
tion for future guidance. This is foreign to the judicial function 
and is forbidden by the doctrine of separation of powers, which 
is binding as well upon the courts of Utah as upon the federal 
courts. 
(b) The decree of the Court below directs the operation of 
a federal reclamation project. But the power of Congress over 
the operation of federal reclamation projects derives from the 
federal Constitution and is exclusive of all State authority. 
Congress has not authorized the States or the courts of the 
States to direct in any particular the operation of these proj-
ects. 
(c) The decree of the Court below substitutes the will of the 
Court for the will of the Secretary of the Interior, who is 
charged by law with responsibility for the operation of fed-
eral reclamation projects. The doctrine of separation of powers 
which precludes the court from promulgating, a legislative reg-
ulation in the first place, also precludes it from assuming direc-
tion of the executive function. 
(d) The decree of the Court below makes new contracts for 
the parties. No court has power to do this. 
IV. Plaintiffs failed to establish a cause of action against de-
fendants and even though jurisdiction of the United States 
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and the Secretary of the Interior were assumed the trial court 
should have entered judgment dismissing the complaint. 
ARGUMENT 
It is important to note that this case is not a contest be-
tween appropriators .and it was not brought to determine 
priorities. It is a contest between rival camps of water users 
under a reclamation project of the United States respecting 
administration of the project water supply, the right to the 
use of which has been appropriated by the United States under 
Utah law. Such interests as .all these water users have in that 
supply derive solely from contracts with the United States. 
These contracts are creatures of federal reclamation law, to 
be determined by that law and not by the law of Utah. 
This is an action, purely and simply, for a declaratory judg-
ment. The only relief really sought by the petition is a declara-
tion that all parties be limited "to the amount of water pro-
vided in their respective contracts with the United States." 4 
So stated, it is apparent that plaintiffs have misconceived their 
forum because, as this Court knows, the United States can be 
sued on its contracts for monetary relief only in the federal 
courts (28 U.S.C. § 1346, 1491), and in no court for specific 
relief. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 703 
(1949). It is to be noted the United States is the other party 
to every contract to which the attention of the Court below was 
solicited by the petition. But, '"ere it not for the impediments 
hereinafter discussed to obtaining the relief sought against the 
United States and the Secretary of the Interior, plaintiffs did 
not 1nisconceive their appropriate re1nedy, if they have a cause 
of action against anyone (which we deny), because declaratory 
relief is n1ost proper where the construction of "Titten instru-
4 Second pra~·er of the petition. The first prayer of the petition actually 
only supplem~c'nts the ~0eond. It requests that nll water users "be charged 
with all of the water that they receiYe''--something quite meaningless unless 
1 h<>Y :1 re limited to their contrn dun 1 entitlements. The third and fourth 
JH·ayPrs of the pPtition do not enlarge the contractual basis of this suit and 
in any event have been ~tricken by agreement of the parties. The fifth 
prayer is for "an nppropriate decree to insure a compliance with its determi-
nation." The ~ixth prnyN· is for relief pendente lite and the seventh is for 
such further order as is just and proper. 
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ments or contracts, wills, deeds, etc., will resolve the contro-
versy. Unresponsive to the plaintiffs' petition, however, the 
Court below entered a decree which, it is submitted, will not 
withstand analysis. The question put to the Court by plain-
tiffs was: "Can the defendants, under their contracts with the 
United States, use river water without a full charge being made 
therefor?" Answering that question in the affirmative, the 
Court then proceeded to determine: "How much of a charge 
should be made for the use of such water?" When the Court 
attempted in its decree to answer that ques:tion, it passed by the 
pales of the judicial function and entered the legislative prov-
ince of rate making. This it could not constitutionally do. 
The second prayer of the petition shows that the suit is not 
one for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river 
system or other source,5 but only one for determination of con-
tractual entitlement of the defendant-type water users to share 
in the rights of one appropriator-the United States. It is ob-
vious that the questions presented by the petition could not be 
answered until the Court interpreted the provisions of all con-
tracts executed between the United States and water users of 
the defendant type. (Supra, footnote 4.) Yet the Court be-
low made no real interpretation of the contracts. It found that 
there were hundreds of them (Fdg. 16); that there were nine 
different types of them (Fdg. 45); and that the period of deliv-
ery of water under some was from May 1st to November 1st of 
each year and under others was unspecified (Fdg. 45). "Most" 
of the individual defendants' contracts for delivery of water 
through the Strawberry High Line Canal failed to specify the 
period during which water would be delivered, if the contrac-
tual provision reproduced in Finding 30 is typical. To note that 
is to wrestle with the problem of interpretation but not to solve 
it. 
The evidence shows that 138 contracts were executed with in-
dividuals of the defendant type (Tr. 42) containing the follow-
ing common provision: 
2. The quantitive measure of the water right hereby 
applied for is that quantity of water which shall be 
5 This contention is addressed in Part I of this argument, infra. 
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beneficially used for the irrigation of said irrigable lands 
up to, but not exceeding, two (2) acre-feet per acre per 
annum, measured at the head of the High Line Canal; 
and in no case exceeding the share, proportionate to 
irrigable acreage, of the w.ater supply actually available 
as determined by the Project Manager or other proper 
officer of the United States, or of its successors in the 
control of the project, during the irrigation season for 
the irrigation of lands under said unit. The said water 
shall be delivered at the head of the High Line Canal 
during the irrigation season from May 1 to October 1 of 
each year in a flow as nearly uniform as practicable, un-
less otherwise mutually agreed, and will be distributed 
throughout the months of the irrigation season in ac-
cordance with the schedule of delivery adopted by the 
Secretary of the Interior for the High Line l~ nit. The 
applicant .assumes all risk of loss in transporting the 
water from the point of delivery to the said lands. 
[Emphasis supplied.] (Def. Ex. 18.) 
The Court below found that the season of "high water" in the 
Spanish Fork River "usually occurs between about April 1 
and May 20, and usually lasts not more than two or three 
weeks" (Fdg. 4 7). Suppose that any part of the high-water 
flow occurs before May 1 or the extreme case where it all 
occurs before May 1. Isn't it true that, in the case of a water 
user whose contract contains the provision quoted above, the 
limit of two acre-feet per acre per annum does not apply with 
respect to river water delivered before May 1? Isn't this even 
more persuasive when we consider the following provision from 
the contract which the United States executed "-ith the Straw-
berry High Line Canal Company? 
The water for the High Line lTnit will be delivered at 
the head of the High Line Canal which is located in 
the southeast quarter of section 33, TownshiJ) 8 South, 
Range 3 East during the irrigation season of May 1 to 
October 1 of eaeh year in accordance with the terms of 
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the existing contracts and public notices and future 
contracts and public notices. * * *. [Emphasis sup,.. 
plied.] (Plf. Ex. 12.) 6 
And isn't it clear beyond question that under the quoted con-
tract provision the ultimate determination of the quantity of 
water actually to be delivered is to be made by the authorized 
officer or .agent of the United States operating the project on 
the basis of his estimate (and not the estimate of the Court 
or Utah State Engineer) of the water supply actually available 
"for the irrigation of lands under said unit"? 
In any event, plaintiffs' petition necessarily sought a declara-
tion that would fairly interpret every contract held by indi-
vidual water users of the defendant type. If that was the steep 
:and thorny way to ultimate solution, it might at least have re-
sulted in a decree on its face within the power of the Court to 
render, subject to the questions hereinafter discussed respecting 
'SUability of the United States and the Secretary of the Interior 
and the capacity of the Courts to control the executive branch 
of the United States government, rather than in the legislative 
rule which the Court adopted quite unsolicited by any of the 
parties. 
8 And see the public notice published May 21, 1917, by the Secretary of 
the Interior, paragraph 14 of which reads as follows: 
"14. Schedule of water delivery for High Line Unit.-During the irriga,. 
tion season of 1917 and thereafter, until further notice, water will be 
,delivered to all lands of the High Line Unit, Strawberry Valley Project, 
Utah, under Public Notice in accordance with the following schedule: In 
May, 18% of the total amount called for by the water-right application, in 
·as near a uniform flow as practicable. The remainder of the season's 
supply to be delivered as demanded, but not to exceed 27lh% of the total 
amount in any one month, in as near a uniform flow as practicable, during 
the remainder of the irrigation season, which is from May 1 to September 
30." [Emphasis supplied.] (Def. Ex. 54.) 
Other public notices subsequently issued, as those of March 11, 1919 (Def. 
Ex. 58), February 20, 1920 (Def. Ex. 59), April 26, 1920 (Def. Ex. 61), 
February 15, 1921 (Def. Ex. 62), fail to define the period of delivery 
..otherwise. 
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L The Court below had no jurisdiction over the United States 
~nd could acquire none. As the United States was an indis-
pensable party, however, the entire action should have been 
dismissed 
(a) Section 666, 43 U.S.C., enacted as a rider to the Department of Justice 
ltp'ptopriation Act, 1953, was intended to and does authorize the joinder 
of the United States as a defendant only in suits which are sui generis, 
relating to the general adjudication of rights to the use of water of a 
river system or other source 
In In Re Bear River Drainage Area, 2 Utah 2d. 208,271 P. 2d 
846 (1954), this Court said "It is elemental that the Federal 
government cannot be sued without its consent and it has been 
held that there is no distinction between suits against the gov-
ernment directly and suits against its property''/ and "The 
waiver of sovereign immunity is the sole prerogative of Con-
gress." To the same effect see: United States v. Sherwood, 312 
U.S. 584, 586 (1941); United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495,500 
(1940); Minnesota v. United States, supra, footnote 7; Arizooo 
v. California, 298 U.S. 558, 568 (1935). 
The first question, then, presented by this appeal is: Did the 
Court below have jurisdiction over the United States? 
The fact that this is a suit for declaratory judgment does 
not confer jurisdiction upon the Court. The federal Declar-
atory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202, does not in it-
self authorize suit against the United States (a fortiori, the 
Utah statute does not), but provides an additional remedy 
only where the jurisdiction of the federal court has already 
attached by virtue of some other statute. See Aetna Casualty 
and Surety Co. v. Quarles (C.A. 4, 1937) 92 F. 2d 321, wherein 
the Court said: "The Declaratory Judgments Act does not add 
to a Court's jurisdiction, but it is a procedural statute provid-
ing for an additional remedy for use in cases of ·which the Fed-
eral courts already had jurisdiction. In a suit for relief under 
the Declaratory Judgments Act, the question is not whether 
jurisdiction shall be assu1ned but whether in exercising juris-
diction already conferred, a discretion exists with respect to 
granting· the rPnwdy prayed for." Particularly pertinent is 
7 
"A prO('PPding- ng-ninst property in whkh the Fnited States has an inter-
est is a suit againHt the Unitl'd States", llfiuncsota v. United States, 305 U.S. 
382, 386 ( 1938) . 
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the following language of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit in Brownell v. Ketcham Wire and Manu-
facturing Co., 211 F. 2d 121 (1954): "The Declaratory Judg-
ments Act does not constitute a consent of the United States 
to be sued but merely grants an aJdditional remedy in eases 
where jurisdiction already exists in the Court." 
Plaintiffs will say (in fact will be obliged to say) that juris-
diction is authorized by 43 U.S.C. § 666. But that statute 
does not grant that consent without which this suit must faiL 
Subdivision (a) of§ 666, 43 U.S.C., enacted as a rider to the: 
Department of Justice Appropriation Act of 1953, reads as; 
follows: 
Consent is hereby given to join the United States as: 
a defendant in any suit ( 1) for the adjudication of 
rights to the use of water of a river system or other 
source, or (2) for the administration of such rights, 
where it appears that the United States is the owner 
of or is in the process of acquiring water rights by ap-
propriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange, 
or otherwise, and the United States is a necessary party 
to such suit. The United States, when a party to any 
such suit, shall ( 1) be deemed to have waived any 
right to plead that the State laws are inapplicable or 
that the United States is not amenable thereto by rea-
son of its sovereignty, and (2) shall be subject to the-
judgments, orders, and decrees of the court having ju-
risdiction, and may obtain review thereof, in the same-
manner and to the same extent as a private individual 
under like circumstances: Provided, That no judgment 
for costs shall be entered against the United States in 
any such suit. 
But this is not a suit for the adjudication or administration 
of rights to the use of water of a river system or other source. 
It is a suit for a declaratory judgment. The petition, which is 
so styled, recites that the action "is brought pursuant to the· 
Declaratory Judgment Act of Utah, the same being Chapter 33 
of Title 78, U.C.A., 1958." Compare the general determination 
law of Utah, Chapter 4 of Title 73., U.C.A., 19153. The follow--
5.0635.6--59-3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
14 
ing considerations show that the federal statute was enacted 
to permit joinder of the United States only in suits for the 
general adjudication of water rights, not at all in suits such as 
this under the declaratory judgment acts. 
Suits for the general adjudication of water rights are, as this 
Court knows, actions sui generis, Weil, Water Rights in the 
Western States, 3d ed., vol. 2, page 1125; Holbrook Irrigation 
District v. Fort Lyon Canal Co., 84 Colo. 174, 195, 269 Pac . 
. 57 4, 582; Hough v. Porter, 51 Or. 318, 439, 98 Pac. 1083, 1109, 
,common in the law of the Western States in one form or 
:another, Weil, supra, pages 1120, 1125. There is a universal 
requirement in such suits that all known claimants to the 
water supply be joined and that their individual rights be 
determined by the final decree. The reason for this is pointed 
out by the court's opinion in Washington State Sugar Co. v. 
Sheppard (C.C., D. Idaho, N.D. 1911) 186 Fed. 233, 235: 
* * * it is highly important that all claimants to the 
right to divert the water of a natural stream for bene-
ficial purposes should be brought into the same court 
in a single action, and therein be required to wage their 
claims, in order that such claims, necessarily more or 
less interdependent and conditioned one upon the other, 
may be settled and defined by a single decree. The 
cogency of the reasons for such course is so thoroughly 
appreciated that almost invariably the state courts in 
the arid region, where the doctrine of appropriation 
prevails, have shown solicitude and have exercised great 
care in requiring that all claimants be made parties in 
suits of this character. 
The nature of such suits is put this way in this Court's 
opinion in Bear River, supra, p. 12: 
The purpose of the statutory procedure for the de-
termination of water rights is to prevent piecemeal liti-
gation or a multiplicity of suits and to provide a means 
of determining all rights in one action. * * * A general 
determination * * * differs from the ordinary private 
suit in that it is a statutory procedure which n1ay be 
commenced by the state engineer for the purpose of 
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bringing into the suit every water claimant or user on 
a single source or system and require them to litigate 
and settle their relative rights in one proceeding. 
And in this way by the Supreme Court of the United States, 
construing the Oregon statute which is the counterpart of the 
Utah general determination law: 
* * *, the proceeding in question is a quasi public 
proceeding, set in motion by a public agency of the 
State. All claimants are required to appear and prove 
their claims; no one can refuse without forfeiting his 
claim, and all have the same relation to the proceeding. 
It is intended to be universal and to result in a complete 
ascertainment of all existing rights, to the end; First, 
that the waters may be distributed, under public super-
vision, among the lawful claimants according to their 
respective rights without needless waste or controversy; 
Second, that the rights of all may be evidenced by 
appropriate certificates and public records, always read-
ily accessible, and may not be dependent upon the tes-
timony of witnesses with its recognized infirmities and 
uncertainties, and, Third, that the amount of surp1us 
or unclaimed water, if any, may be ascertained and 
rendered available to intending appropriators. 
* * * * * 
* * * In such a proceeding the rights of the several 
claimants are so closely related that the presence of all 
is essential to the accomplishment of its purpose, and 
it hardly needs statement that these cannot be attained 
by mere private suits in which only a few of the claim-
ants are present, for only their rights as between them-
selves could be determined * * *. Pacific Live Stock 
Co. v. Oregon Water Board, 241 U.S. 440, 447 (1916) 
et seq. 
That the universal requirement of joinder of all known 
claimants is not limited to statutory adjudication suits appears 
further from a recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit. There the Court said: 
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The only proper method of adjudicating the rights 
on a stream, whether riparian or appropriative or mixed,. 
is to. have all owners of land on the watershed and all 
appropriators who use water from the stream involved 
in another watershed in court at the same time. 
The trial court violated this principle hy issuing a 
declaratory judgment as to th-e right of the United 
States as against one claimant whose rights were junior, 
which had the effect of preventing a trial of the other· 
water rights involved without giving a hearing as to the 
individual owners.8 
Thus it is apparent that a suit to which something less than 
the whole number of known claimants of rights to use the 
waters of the river system or other source sought to be adjudi-
cated are joined is not an adjudication suit within the generally 
accepted meaning of that term, and that this is not such a suit. 
It is further apparent that this is not a suit of the type con-
sented to by 43 U.S.C. § 666. The legislative history of that 
statute shows that the Congress intended nothing different 
from what the language of the statute clearly expresses and 
that consent to the joinder of the United States in general 
adjudication suits only is granted. The then Chairman of the 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary stated that the act 
is not in tended to be used for any other purpose than to 
allow the United States to be joined in a suit wherein 
it is necessary to adjudicate all of the rights of vari-
ous owners on a given strerun. This is so because unless 
all of the parties owning or in the process of acquiring 
water rights on a particular strerun Call be joined as 
parties defendant, any subsequent decree would be of 
little value.9 
But in demonstrating the inapplicability here of Section 666 
we are not restricted to the language of the st.a.tute and to the 
8 State of Oalifornia et al., v. The United States of Amf"rica. (C. A. 9, 
1956), 235 F. 2d 647,663. 
0 Report No. 755, 82d Cong., 1st St=>ss .. pngt=> 9. See Appendix hereto. In 
the npp<>mlix 11wn~ nre set forth additional excerpts from the Report which 
show that only general adjudication suUs were contemplated by the lan-
guage of the statute in question. 
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legislative history as disclosed by Senate Report No. 755. 
Miller v. Jennings (C.A. 5, 1957), 243, F. 2'd 15-7, was a suit for 
declaratory and injunctive relief quite similar to this. It was 
brought by several water users and the water district of which 
they were constituents, purporting to represent all other users 
similarly situated, for a declaration of their asserted rights 
under a contract with the United States providing for the 
delivery of project water surplus to the needs of the Rio Grande 
Federal Reclamation Project. There, as here, the named de-
fendants were the United States, officers of the Department 
of the Interior, and certain project landowners who were al-
legedly sued as representatives of all other landowners similarly 
situated. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in affirming dis-
missal of the case, denied plaintiffs' claim of the applicability 
of Section 666 in the following language: 
The United States has not given its consent to be 
joined as a defendant in every suit involving water 
rights. It may be made a party only in suits 'for the 
adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river 
system or other source.' There can be an adjudication 
of rights with respect to the upper Rio Grande only in 
a proceeding where all persons who have rights are be-
fore the tribunal. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
has most succinctly stated the doctrine in this manner: 
"The only proper method of adjudicating the rights 
on a stream, whether riparian or appropriative or 
mixed, is to have all owners of lands on the watershed 
and all appropriators who use water from the streams 
involved in another watershed in court at the same 
time." People of the State of California v. United 
States, 9 Cir., 1956, 235 F. 2d 647, 633. See Pacific 
Live Stock Co. v. Lewis, 241 U.S. 440, 36 S. Ct. 637, 60 
L.Ed.1084. 
With respect to plaintiffs' contention that the suit was main-
tainable as a class action, the Court said: 
It is urged by the plaintiffs that all persons having 
any interest in the subject matter of the suit are parties 
to the suit or are members of a class represented by 
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parties to the suit. The same contention was ably 
argued, carefully considered, and rejected in Martinez 
v. Maverick County Water Control& Improvement Dis-
trict No. 1, 5 Cir., 1955, 219 F. 2d 666. There, as here, 
a suit was brought for a declaratory judgment as to 
water rights. There the plaintiffs asked for a decree re-
serving the right to plaintiffs to apply for injunctive re-
lief. Here the plaintiffs pray for a declaration of their 
rights and for an injunction. This difference does not 
create a distinction. There it was said: 
"The declaratory judgment would be binding only on 
those parties actually before the court; each new party 
asserting his rights in the waters of the river, in the 
same or any other court, would have the right to reliti-
gate the questions already adjudged as between those 
before the court." Martinez v. Maverick County Water 
Control and Improvement Dist. No. 1, 5 Cir., 1955, 219 
F. 2d 666, 672. 
On October 14, 1957, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in 
that case. 355 U.S. 827,885. 
A suit for adjudication of water rights within the generally 
accepted meaning thereof and within the meaning of Section 
666 is just what Senator McCarran described in his letter to 
Senator Magnuson, included in Senate Report No. 755, and it 
is what the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals described in Miller 
v. Jenning s-a proceeding to determine the relative rights of all 
users "on a given stream" or other source. 
But plaintiffs sought only a determination that the United 
States and its agents may not deliver to the defendant-type 
water users of the Strawberry Valley Reclamation Project more 
project water than the quantities specified in their respective 
contracts with the United States. They did not ask a determi-
nation of the relative rights of the various water users on a 
river syste1n or other source. They did not ask an adjudication 
of water rights. 
The United States is an appropriator of the waters of the 
Spanish Fork River. So are the plaintiff canal companies. 
But adjudication of those rights and the rights of other appro-
priators on the river is not the purpose of this suit, even if 
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such were possible, contrary to the authorities above reviewed, 
in the absence of all such appropriators. The individual water 
users, plaintiff and defendant, and all other users whom they 
are supposed to represent by this purported class action, are 
not appropriators.10 The project water supply, in which they 
have contractual interests only and the use of which by de-
fendant-type users is the sole subject of controversy, is, as 
correctly noted by the Court below in paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 
of the Decree, the property of the United States. 
The Congressional consent to suits for adjudication cannot 
be extended by implication to suits such as this. For "It is 
not * * * [the court's] right to extend the waiver of sov-
ereign immunity more broadly than has been directed by the 
Congress." 11 Any contention that the statute should be lib-
erally construed to permit this suit is clearly refuted by the 
following language of the Supreme Court in its opinion in 
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 703 (1949): 
It is argued that the principle of sovereign immunity 
is an archaic hangover not consonant with modern 
morality and that it should therefore be limited wher-
ever possible. There may be substance in such a view-
point as applied to suits for damages. The Congress 
has increasingly permitted such suits [for damages] to 
be maintained against the sovereign and we should give 
hospitable scope to that trend. But the reasoning is not 
applicable to suits for specific relief. For, it is one 
thing to provide a method by which a citizen may be 
compensated for a wrong done to him by the Govern-
ment. It is a far different matter to permit a court to 
exercise its compulsive powers to restrain the Govern-
10 This is subject to the caveat that in this declaratory judgment action 
there is no showing thaJt they are appropriators. In a suit for general 
adjudication the truth of that matter could be determined. As all water 
claimants must be joined under the statute before the United States can 
be, supra, the error is here presented of joinder of the United States in a 
type of action where, if the action is maintainable at al], joinder of other 
appropriators is irrelevant. 
11 United States v. Sha;w, 309 U.S. 495, 502 (1939). See also Belknap v. 
Schild, 161 U.S. 10, 16 (1895) ; Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382 
(1939). 
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ment from acting, or to compel it to act. There ,are 
the strongest reasons of public policy for the rule that 
such relief cannot be had ag,ainst the sovereign. The 
Government, as representative of the community as a 
whole, cannot be stopped in its tracks by- any plaintiff 
who presents a disputed question of property or con-
tract rights. [Emphasis supplied.] 
Enough has been said to demonstrate that this is not a suit 
for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river 
system or other source. Neither is it a suit for the adminis-
tration of water rights within the meaning of 43 U.S.C. § 666. 
In such suits courts can logically administer only between con-
flicting water rights inter sese. But such a suit certainly is 
not maintainable for the internal management of one water 
right [as the Government's, here] which is not alleged to be 
adversely affecting others. Yet that constitutes the judgment 
of the Court below as will appear more particularly in Part 
III of this argument. No matter how the United States dis-
tributed its water, no injury could have been incurred there-
from by the other appropriators party to this suit (the canal 
companies) as long as the United States did not trespass upon 
their shares of the flow. There is no single allegation in the 
petition that they were injured or apprehended injury-and 
no evidence.12 
The statute can't be construed to authorize administration of 
single rights only, while at the same time providing for nothing 
less than systen1-wide adjudications. The contiguity of the 
words of the statute prohibit. _.As the statutory consent is to 
"the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system 
or other source" and to "the ad1ninistration of such rights," it 
can't be that suits for nd1ninistration are narrower in purview 
than suits for adjudication. The statutory consent is not to 
suits for the ad1ninistration of "any rights," or of a single 
12 Why plaintiff canal compani~:-•:o: are even in the case is not clear to us. 
They do not dnim 1that their rights have been infringed and they are 
strangers to the contract:o: betwt'en the United States and the individual 
water usPrs served by their systems. Their contracts with the United 
States rPl•ate only to bh.e tl'ansportation of project water to the project 
lands served by their respective systems (Fdgs. 25 and 26). 
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right-it is to "suits for the administration of [rights to the use 
of water of a river system or other source]." 
We submit that 43 U.S.C. § 666 authorizes only suits for ad-
ministration which are ancillary to suits for adjudication. Such 
is clearly indicated by the following language from the legisla-
tive history. That language is also proof that joinder of all ap-
propriators is no less necessary in suits for administration than 
in suits for adjudication. 
It is most clear that where water rights have been ad-
judicated by a court and its final decree entered, or where 
such rights are in the course of adjudication by a court, 
the court adjudicating or having adjudicated such rights 
is the court possessing the jurisdiction to enter its orders 
and decrees with respect thereto and thereafter to en-
force the same by appropriate proceedings. In the 
administration of and the adjudication of water rights 
under State laws the State courts are vested with the 
jurisdiction necessary for the proper and efficient dis-
position thereof, and by reason of the interlocking of 
adjudicated rights on any stream system, any order 
or action affecting one right affects all such rights. 
Accordingly all water users on a stream, in practically 
every case, are interested and necessary parties to any 
court proceedings. [Emphasis supplied.] Senate Re-
port No. 755, supra, footnote 9. 
As Miller v. Jennings, supra, p. 17, is authority for the propo-
sition that this is not a suit for adjudication of water rights 
within the meaning of § 666, so also is it authority for the 
proposition that this is not a suit for administration of such 
rights. For if the suit there involved was not a suit for admin-
istration, neither is this. And while the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals did not expressly discuss in its opinion the language of 
part (2) of the first sentence of the statute, the question was 
before it and what it did say was applicable to that part as well 
as to part (1). It was urged by appellants both to the Court of 
Appeals and in their Petition to the Supreme Court for certi-
orari that the suit was one under the statute for the administra-
tion of water rights if not for adjudication. 
There is a common thread running through suits for the ad-
judication and administration of water rights. This is that 
506B56-59-4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
they are entertained by the courts to settle conflicts between 
owners of rights to the use of water. This suit is not brought 
for that purpose. The only appropriative rights really in-
volved here are those of the United States. The gravamen of 
plaintiffs' suit is not that the United States or any of the de-
fendants are interfering with or impairing any of the plaintiff 
canal companies' appropriative rights but that the individual 
defendants are getting more of the reservoir supply of water 
than they are entitled to. The waters impounded in the reser-
voir belong to the United States. No use made of them can in-
terfere with the appropriative rights of the plaintiff canal com-
panies who have no contracts with the United States relative to 
reservoir water except that they will deliver it to their members. 
The individual plaintiffs and the individual defendants have no 
right to reservoir water except by contract with the United 
States. 
The whole subject matter of this case, and the only relief spe-
cifically prayed, is an interpretation of contracts made under 
and in pursuance of the laws of the United States. The State 
courts can hear suits brought under the statutory water laws for 
adjudication or administration to resolve conflicts between ap-
propriative rights and in some such suits it may be that the 
United States can be joined. The State courts can hear suits 
arising in contract between private citizens. But those courts 
cannot, as a matter of jurisdiction, entertain suits of this nature 
against the United States based purely and simply upon con-
tracts with the United States. 
Neither Section 666, 43 U.S.C., nor any other statute, wajves 
the United States' imn1unity from suits such as this. As, fur-
ther, there is no question but that this action is "a proceeding 
against property in which the United States has an interest," 
Minnesota v. United States, supra, footnote 11, as inescapably 
proved by the decree, it should have been disnll.ssed by the 
Court below. 
(b) Section 666, 43 U.S.C., does not consent that the wilJ of the Utah District 
Court be substituted for that of the Secretary of the Interior, and his 
authorized agents, who are charged by law with the administration of 
the Strawberry Valley Roeclarnation Project. Were the statute to be so 
construed, there would be serious doubt as to its constitutionality 
As noted supra, p. 6, the decree entered herein purports to 
enjoin the United States from interfering with the rights of the 
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plaintiff canal companies to the natural flow of Spanish Fork 
River. The granting of such relief by the trial court was purely 
gratuitous since it was not sought by the petition or justified 
on the basis of the issues which were tried. But aside from 
that specific grant of injunctive relief, it is not questionable 
that the purpose of the suit, even if limited to the relief spe-
cifically prayed by the petition, is to restrain and regulate ad-
ministration of the project water supply by the Secretary of 
the Interior and his authorized agents. The decree which has 
been entered even more plainly attempts to accomplish such 
purpose. The suit therefore should be considered as one for 
specific relief in the effort to determine whether consent is 
given by Section 666. 
To test the accuracy of this analysis, it is necessary only to 
consider the utter futility of a naked declaration upon the 
specific questions referred to in the prayer if the Court were 
not to undertake also to compel by its orders conformity to the 
declarations it has made. And the fact that the test for de-
termining the Court's jurisdiction in a suit for declaratory relief 
is whether the controversy might be entertained in that Court 
if the relief sought were injunctive (Colegrove et al. v. Green, 
328 U.S. 549, 552 (1946)) indicates the judicial view that in-
junction is a concomitant of declaratory relief. 
Apart from the express language of the statute and its leg-
islative history, discussed supra, pp. 12 to 22, there are the 
strongest reasons why § 666 is not to be construed .as authoriz-
ing the relief prayed for against the United States or that 
granted by the decree which the Court entered. Those reasons 
find expression in the authorities reviewed in part I.ll of this 
argument respecting the constitutional incapacity of the judi-
ciary to exercise legislative power and to control the executive 
officers of the United States in the exercise of discretionary 
powers validly conferred by statute.13 
13 It should be noted that we are not contending that the Secretary 
of the Interior, or his agent, the Strawberry Valley Water Users' As-
sociation, may with impunity administer the project water supply in 
disregard of the contracts which have been made with the project land-
owners. If, contrary to our contentions in part IV of this argument, 
the practice of which plaintiffs complain does result in compensable 
injury to the plaintiff-type users, then, as observed by the Supreme Court 
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Thus, in Hudspeth County Conservation & Reclamation 
District No.1 et al. v. Robbins (C.A. 5, 1954), 213 F. 2d 425, 
432, cert. denied 348 U.S.. 833, the Court said: 
* * * Whatever may be the merits of the plaintiffs' 
contentions, the court would have no jurisdiction by 
declaratory judgment, see Lynn v. United States, 5 Cir., 
110 F. 2d 586, 588, or by injunction against Govern-
ment officers to substitute itself in any part of the 
management .and operation of the dams, reservoirs and 
facilities for the agency designated by Congress. * * * 
In New Mexico v. Backer, 199 F. 2d 426, 428 (1952), the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals stated the problem in this 
language: 
The Rio Grande Reclamation Project was constructed 
and operated in the exercise of a proper governmental 
function and in accordance with valid statutes of the 
United States. The facilities were owned by the United 
States and the waters were stored in the reservoir to be 
withdrawn by the United States for authorized govern-
mental purposes. The management, control, and oper-
ation of such facilities are given the Secretary of the 
Interior in broad terms, 43 U.S.C.A. § 373. The United 
States could not hold or operate this vast project except 
through its officials and agents. Backer was perform-
ing these functions for the Secretary of the Interior 
and under his instructions. \Vhatever he did, he did 
for the Secretary under authority of the reclamation 
laws of the United States. The operation of the project 
and facilities depended upon the flow of \Yater from 
the reservoir. If this flow could be enjoined or affected 
by court decree or order directed to Barker, he would 
be under the direction of the court and not his supe-
of the United States in Iva.nJwe bTigafi.on District '· Mcf'racken, 357 U.S. 
27!1, 297 ( 1958) "the courts are open for redress" in a suit for compensa-
tion. What we are contending is that Congress has vested the Secretary 
of the Interior, and his authorized agents, with authority to administer 
this reclamation projt>ct, including its water supply. and that Congress 
has not consented ~to the assumption of !Such administration by the courts 
of Utah or, for that matter, th.e courts of the United States. 
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riors .as representatives of the United States. It would 
be a complete ouster of the United States over the 
control and management of its own property and 
facilities. 
And we repeat here the language of the Supreme Court 
in the Larson case, hereinabove quoted at page 19: 
* * * For, it is one thing to provide a method by 
which a citizen may be compensated for a wrong done 
to him by the Government. It is a far different matter 
to permit a court to exercise its compulsive powers to 
restrain the Government from acting, or to compel 
it to act. There are the strongest reasons of public 
policy for the rule that such relief cannot be had against 
the sovereign. The Government, as representative of 
the community as a whole, cannot be stopped in its 
tracks by any plaintiff who presents a disputed ques-
tion of property or contract rights. [Emphasis 
supplied.] 
Although in Belknap v. Schild, supra, p. 19, the Supreme 
Court said "unless expressly permitted by act of Congress, 
no injunction can be granted against the United States," 
it is of the utmost significance that neither in that case nor 
in any other decision of an appellate court has it been found 
that the Congress has extended such permission. 
In the face of these precedents, it is inconceivable that 
there can be found by implication 14 in a statute "not intended 
to be used for any other purpose than to allow the United 
States to be joined in a suit wherein it is necessary to adjudi-
cate all of the rights of various owners on a given stream," 15 
the consent by Congress that the Government can be stopped 
in its tracks by any plaintiff who presents any disputed ques-
tion of property or contract rights relating to the use of water. 
14 
"It [permission to sue the United States] will not be implied * * *." 
North Dakota-Montana Wheat Grower's Assn. v. United States (C.A. 8, 
1933), 66 F. 2d 573, 577; cert. denied 291 U.S. 672 (1934). 
15 The language immediately preceding that quoted from Senator Mc-
Carran's letter to Senator Magnuson is also especially significant: "S. 18 
is not intended to be used for the purpose of obstructing the project of 
which you ·speak or any similar project * * * ." See Appendix hereto. 
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The statute in express terms permits joinder of the United 
States as a defendant only in suits for the adjudication of 
rights to the use of water of a river system or other source, 
or for the administration of such rights. There is no refer-
ence to actions such as this for injunctive or declaratory re-
life. That is in keeping with the view expressed by the Su-
preme Court in the Larson case that "There are the strongest 
reasons of public policy for the rule that such [injunctive] 
relief cannot be had against the sovereign." [Emphasis sup· 
plied.] Since neither injunctive nor declaratory relief is ex-
pressly provided for, it necessarily follows that the Congress 
has not waived the immunity of the united States from suits 
of this character, for, as discussed above: "[The United 
States] cannot be subjected to legal proceedings, at law or in 
equity, without their consent; and whoever institutes such 
proceedings must bring his case within the authority of some 
act of Congress." 16 
Were Section 666 to be construed otherwise, serious con-
stitutional questions would be presented. Among them would 
be the question whether Congress can constitutionally delegate 
to the courts, either of the States or of the United States, 
supervision of the performance by the executive branch of its 
functions in the operation of a federal project. Since relief 
is sought against the United States as well as against specified 
officers, it must be assumed that judgment for the plaintiff 
would of necessity, to be effective at all, be binding upon all 
executive officers, including the President, and perhaps also 
upon the Congress. The problem would be silnilar to those 
dealt with by the Supren1e Court in Jfississippi v. Johnson, 
71 U.S. 475 (1866), and by Judge Pope in his concurring opin-
ion in United States v. United States District Court, infra, 
pp. 31-32. Cf. Marbury v. i1ladison, infra, p. 41; Decatur 
v. Paulding, infra, p. 41; .1llartin v. Jfotl, 25 U.S. 19, 31 
(1827); Riverside Oil Co. v. Hitchcock, infra, p. 41; United 
States v. Ide, infra, p. 42; 11 An1. Jur .. Const. Law, p. 889, 
§ 190, footnote 1, p. 887, ~ 188. Congress may not ·waive the 
sovereign immunity where the result would be to transfer to 
the judiciary powers which under the Constitution repose in 
16 Belknap v. Sohild, 8Upra, p. 19. 
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the executive branch of the Government. The doctrine of 
separation of powers which precludes the legislative branch 
from assuming to itself executive powers also forbids the trans-
fer of such powers to the judiciary. (See infra, p. 42.) 
We submit that neither the express language of the statute, 
its legislative history, nor general policy considerations permit 
an interpretation of § 6~66, 43 U.S.C., as authorizing this suit 
against the United States. 
II. The Court below had no jurisdiction over the Secretary of 
the Interior and could acquire none. As the Secretary was, 
however, an indispensable party, the entire action should 
have been dismissed 
Not much need be said in support of this point. The Sec-
retary of the Interior has been given by Congress very broad 
authority for the operation, management and control of fed-
eral reclamation projects, 43 U.S.C. § 373. By the decree of 
the Court below, it is his hands which are tied, his congres-
sionally delegated authority which is shackled. He is, there-
fore, an indispensable party. But he cannot be made a party. 
This is because his official residence is the District of Colun1bia 
and for that reason he is without the territorial jurisdiction of 
any courts, State or Federal, except the courts of the District. 
See Blackmar v. Guerre, 342 U.S. 512 (1951). Certainly the 
Utah District Court was not capable of bringing him within 
its jurisdiction by service of its process on him in \V ashington, 
D.C. 
Moreover, the trial court's judgment against him, even were 
the United States not specifically named, would expend itself 
on the United States and the United States' immunity from 
suit is as much a bar to the suit against the Secretary as it is 
to the suit against the United States. See Larson v. Domestic 
& Foreign Corp., supra, p. 19; New Mexico v. Backer, supra, 
p. 26; Hudspeth County Conservation & Reclamation District 
No. 1 et al v. Robbins, supra, p. 24; Ogden River Water Users' 
Assn. v. Weber Basin Water Conservancy District (C.A. 10, 
1956), 238 F. 2d 936. 
None of the contracts out of which this action stems seem 
to have been made with the Commissioner of Reclamation. 
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Moreover, his powers and authority are derived as a subordi-
nate of the Secretary. If, because of these reasons, he is not 
an indispensable party, nonetheless the District of Columbia 
is his official residence and the service of process upon him 
was also outside the jurisdiction of the lower court. Motion 
made in the Court below to quash service of process upon 
him should have been granted. 
III. The decree entered is invalid for the following additional 
reasons. It should be set aside and the Court below di-
rected to dismiss the action 
The third question presented by this appeal is: Did the 
Court below have jurisdiction to render this particular decree? 
We submit that it did not as a matter of constitutional law, 
both Federal and, be it noted, of the State of Utah. 
This portion of the argument would be no less valid even if 
the Court below had secured jurisdiction of the United States 
and of the Secretary of the Interior, which, of course, we abso-
lutely deny. 
We appeal from the whole of the decree) because the Court 
had no jurisdiction to enter it as previously pointed out) and 
also because no single paragraph thereof is responsive to the 
pleadings and because judgment of dismissal is the only judg-
ment on the merits which the record would support. 
But especially we appeal from paragraphs 13 through 16 of 
the decree, not only because they are even more strikingly un-
responsive to the pleadings than is the rest of the decree-of 
which the cross appeal of plaintiffs is eloquent proof-but be-
cause they are out-and-out regulation of a federal reclamation 
project, and for that reason alone cannot stand. 
There is nothing in 43 U.S.C. § 666 which remotely suggests 
that Congress has authorized operation, management or regu-
lation of a federal project by a State court. 
That the Court below has attempted nothing less is apparent 
from a consideration of paragraphs 13 through 16 of the decree. 
In paragraph 13, "the Court has deemed it proper and neces-
sary to make and does make the following provisions of the 
manner in which the waters of the project shall be regulated 
and distributed during the next ten years after the entry of 
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this decree." [Emphasis supplied.] Following this in the same 
paragraph are the detailed provisions providing, by regulating 
the charge to be applied, how much of the United States' water 
the project landowners may receive. 
In paragraph 14 the State Engineer of Utah is designated as 
"Referee," and his independent estimate of the amount of 
water available to the project in any given year is binding 
upon the Water Users' Association, the United States' manag-
ing .agent, as to what part of the Court's formula to apply. 
Paragraph 15 provides that when the volume of river water 
warrants, sales of excess project water may be made by theW a-
ter Users' Association at such rates as will not circumvent or 
nullify the schedule of charges set forth in paragraph 13. 
By paragraph 16, the Court retains jurisdiction of the cause 
for ten years "for the sole purpose of making changes in the 
percentages of charges to be made for the use of project river 
water." 
The argument below will show that in entering this decree 
the trial court committed grave error. 
(a) The Court below .has promulgated a legislative regulation for future 
guidance. This is foreign to the judicial function and is forbidden by the 
doctrine of separation of powers, which is binding as well upon the courts 
of Utah as upon the Federal courts 
In its most vulnerable aspect, the decree is legislative rule-
making quite outside the judicial function. Plaintiffs' pleading 
is entitled "Petition for Declaratory Judgment," and the ju-
risdiction of the court is expressly invoked "pursuant to the 
Declaratory Judgment Act of Utah, the same being Chapter 
33 of Title 78, U.C.A., 1953." This is substantially the Uni-
form Declaratory Judgment Act and provides. that the district 
courts of Utah "shall have power to declare rights, status, and 
other legal relations, whether or not further relief is or could 
be claimed." It would seem hardly assailable that the setting 
of an arbitrary charge in futuro for the use of water is not the 
declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations. True 
enough, in Utah as in other States other relief, including coer-
cive relief, can be afforded in an action for a declaratory judg-
ment, Gray v. Deja, 103 Utah 339, 135 P. 2d 251 (1943). But 
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, it must, we think, be relief of .a type otherwise sanctioned in 
law or equity, as damages, injunction, specific performance, 
cancellation, rescission, reformation, etc. A rule setting an 
arbitrary charge for future use of water is none of these. It 
partakes of the legislative function which is, generally, "to gov-
ern future conduct," Mulcahey v. Public Service Commission, 
101 Utah 245, 255, 117 P. 2d 298, 302 (1941). The following 
cases demonstrate that such a rule is outside the judicial 
function. 
In Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. v. Denver & New Or-
leans R.R., 110 U.S. 667 (1883) Denver Railroad sought a court 
order requiring Santa Fe to transact the business of through 
traffic with it, the Santa Fe having previously refused to do so. 
Denver contended that upon such refusal of Santa Fe to agree 
"upon the terms of their intercourse a court of equity [could] 
in the absence of statutory regulations, determine what the 
terms should be." The Supreme Court said: 
Such appears to have been the opinion of the Circuit 
Court, and accordingly in its decree a compulsory busi-
ness connection was ·established between the two com-
panies, and rules were laid down for the government of 
their conduct towards each other in this new relation. 
In other words, the court has made an arrangement for 
the business intercourse of these companies such as, in its 
opinion, they ought in law to haYe made for theinselves." 
In holding invalid the Circuit Court's order. the Supre1ne Court 
said: "A court of chancery is not, any 1nore than is a court of 
law, clothed with legislative power. It may enforce, in its own 
appropriate way, the specific performance of an existing legal 
obligation arising out of contract, law, or usage, but it cannot 
create the obligation." 
In Bistor v. Board of Assessors of Cook County, 346 Ill. 362, 
179 N.E. 120, 78 A.L.R. 686 (1931), plaintiff taxpaJers com-
plained that local taxing officials were not proceeding according 
to law in assessing the value of real propert~T and sought a de-
cree fron1 the court directing the n1anner in which the officials 
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were to make the assessments.17 The lower court refused to 
provide any such direction and the Supreme Court of Illinois 
affirmed the dismissal of the bill. The following language of 
the Court points up the division between the judicial and the 
legislative function: 
It is long-established and well-recognized practice in 
this state that a court of equity will exercise jurisdiction 
to enjoin the collection of a tax where the tax is. not au-
thorized by law, where it is assess.ed upon property not 
subject to taxation, and where the property has been 
fraudulently assessed at too high a rate. (Citations.) 
This is not a case of that kind. The bill in this case 
attacks the assessment because it is. alleged the assessing 
officers have failed to follow the course imposed upon 
them by law in making the assessment, and it is not a 
bill which seeks to correct the wrong done to the com-
plainants alone, but it seeks to have a court of equity 
assume general supervision of the assessment and direct 
in advance the officers charged with the duty of making 
it, as to the manner in which they shall proceed. 
The Court concluded that 
The supervision of the officers appointed by law for 
the assessment of property for taxation by directing 
them in advance how they shall proceed is foreign to 
the jurisdiction of equity. 
In United States v. United States District Court, (C.A. 9', 
19·53) 206 F. 2d 303, the United States sought a writ of prohi-
bition against an order, issued pendente lite by the District 
Court, commanding the release of certain waters from Friant 
Dam for the benefit of downstream water users who had free 
access to such waters prior to the construction of the dam. 
The order attacked by the Government was characterized by 
Judge Pope in the following language in a concurring opinion: 
17 The case cited differs from this in that there plaintiffs sought the legis-
lative relief which the lower court granted. In this case legislative relief 
was not even sought by the plaintiffs. 
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Here, the Court [i.e., the District Court], through its 
agent, is about to tell the Bureau of Reclamation what 
work is to be done on or near the pumps of the water 
users. The Bureau may reduce the quantity of water 
discharged downstream only if the Court's agent agrees 
that the reduction will allow sufficient operation of the 
pumps, and reduction below 400 second-feet may be 
made only with the approval of the Court. The Bu-
reau must do the work ori the water users' pumps as 
the Court's agent may, in his opinion, think required. 
In substance, the Court has undertaken to manage 
and control the flow from Friant Dam, pendente lite, 
through the Court's agent. (Ibid., 310.) 
This order said Judge Pope, "amounted to putting the Dis-
trict Court in the water distributing business" (Ibid., 311). 
And, ''However well adapted this order may have been to ac-
complish a common sense result, I do not see how power to 
issue it could exist." And, "I think that the court is without 
power to participate in such an enterprise" [i.e., the adminis-
tration of water distribution even with the consent of all par-
ties to the action]. The judicial, as opposed to the legislative, 
function is illustrated by Judge Pope's following remarks crit-
icizing the District Court's order: 
Such a court may enjoin action where necessary to 
preserve the status quo, but it may not create rights, nor 
administratively execute them. Thus, while a district 
court may enjoin the collection of a tax based on an ar-
bitrary overvaluation of property. it may not determine 
what tax would be valid, Rowley v. Chicaoo-o & N.W. 
Ry., 293 U.S. 102, 112, 55 S. Ct. 55, 79 L. Ed. 222, it 
may cancel a franchise to take water for breach thereof, 
but not annul it under a power reserved in the grant, 
Public Service Commission of Puerto Rico v. Have-
meyer, 296 U.S. 506, 518. 56 S. Ct. 360, 80 L. Ed. 357, 
it may set aside a confiscatory public utility r.ate but 
not prescribe a valid one, Central Kentucky Natural 
Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm., 290 U.S. 264,272,54 S. Ct. 
154,78 L. Ed. 307. 
* * * * * 
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* ·»- * But it seems to me that a district court may not 
assume the adminiskation here undertaken, any more 
than such a court, while trying a suit to enjoin an ad-
joining landowner from excavating so as to cause sub-
sidence of plaintiff's land and building, could appoint 
an .agent to locate the place and to supervise the work 
of making the excavation. 
,~n addition to the United States Supreme Court cases cited 
by Judge Pope, see the following: Honolulu Rapid Transit Co. 
v. Hawaii, 211 U.S. 282 (1908), (courts have no business regu-
lating the time schedule of street railway cars); Newton v. 
Consolidated Gas Co., 285 U.S. 165 (1922), ("Rate making is 
no function of the courts and should not be attempted either 
directly or indirectly"); West Ohio Gas Co. v. Comm'n (No. 
1), 294 U.S. 63, 74 (1935), ("A court passing upon a challenge 
to the validity of statutory rates does not determine the rates 
to be adopted as a substitute"). 
We are not unmindful, of course, that the federal courts 
are constitutional courts and, because of the separation of 
powers, without legislative power, Keller v. Potomac Electric 
Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923). Even so, it does not seem to have 
been that doctrine which decided the cases. above set forth. 
The ratio decidendi of these cases seems rather, that rule-
making is "foreign to the jurisdiction of equity", Bistor case, 
supra, p. 36. This limit on the judicial function, transgressed 
here, is expressed by Justice Holmes in Prentis v. Atlantic 
Coast Line Company, 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908): "A judicial 
inquiry investigates, declares and. enforces liabilities as. they 
stand on present or past facts and 'Uinder laws supposed already 
to exist. That is its purpose and end. Leg,i8lation on the 
other hand looks to the future and changes existing conditions 
by making a new rule to be applied thereafter to all or some 
part of those subject to its power. The establishment of a 
rate is the making of a rule for the future, and therefore is 
an act legislative and not judicial in kind ·* * *" 
From this difference in the kind of function, as between 
legislative and judicial, has come the cons:titutiona.l principle 
of the separation of powers. Entirely aside from constitu-
tional law, the cases above cited are authority for the proposi-
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tion that the Court below had no power as a court of equity 
(and of course none at all as a court of law) to provide as 
it did in its decree. 
However, the decree of the Court below in this case also 
violates the doctrine of separation of powers. That apparently 
was the basis upon which the Supreme Court of Appeals of 
Virginia set aside the decree of the trial court in Harrisonburg 
v. Roller, 97 Va. 582, 34 S.E. 523 (1882) in the following 
language: 
The [trial] court, by its decree, not merely perpetu-
ally enjoined the town from performing the work in 
the manner it proposed, but went even further and 
fixed permanently 18 what the grade of the sidewalk 
in front of the residence of the appellee should be, 
and minutely prescribed the manner in which the town 
should do the work. This was plainly beyond the juris-
diction and power of the court. The result of such in-
terference by a court of equity would be to control 
absolutely the council of a city or town in the exercise 
of the legislative functions plainly conferred upon it 
by the charter of the city or town, and to be exercised 
by the council according to its discretion ; to usurp 
powers expressly conferred upon the council; and to 
substitute the discretion of the court in· the place of 
that of the council. 
The Constitution of Utah itself adopts the principle of the 
separation of powers.19 In Young , .. Salt Lake Cdy, 24 Utah 
321, 67 Pac. 1066 (1902), this Court said that under tha.t con-
stitution "powers belonging to one department of the govern-
ment cannot be exercised by others. Courts cannot legislate 
or make laws. This power is vested in the legislature and any 
18 Emphasis in original. 
10 Article Y of the Utah Constitution reads: 
"The power of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into 
three distinct departments, the Legislntiw. the Executiw. and the Judicial; 
and no person charged with the exereise of powers properly belonging to one 
of these (lppartment~. shall exercisE> any functions appertaining to either of 
the others, except in the cases herein express!~· directed or permitted." 
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law which confers such power upon a court or executive officer 
is unconstitutional and void." 20 
(b) The decree of the Court below directs the operation of a federal recla-
mation project. But the power of Congress over the operation of federal 
reclamation projects derives from the Federal constitution and is exclu-
sive of all State authority. Congress has not authorized the States or the 
courts of the States to direct in any paricular the operation of these 
projects 
In a case decided as recently as June 23, 1958,21 the Supreme 
Court of the United States reaffirmed 22 the plenary power of 
the Federal Government with respect to federal reclamation 
projects. The Court said: 
In developing these projects the United States is ex-
pending federal funds and acquiring federal property for 
a valid public and national purpose, the promotion of 
agriculture. This power flows not only from the Gen-
eral Welfare Clause of Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution, 
but also from Art. IV, § 3, relating to the management 
and disposal of federal property. * ·* * 
* * * beyond challenge is the power of the Federal 
Government to impose reasonable conditions on the 
use of federal funds, federal property and federal 
privileges. (Cits.). The lesson of these cases is. that 
the Federal Government may establish and impose 
reasonable conditions relevant to federal interest in the 
20 This is the only Utah case discovered by us which is in point. In that 
case a statute was attacked as unconstitutional because it conferred legis-
lative powers upon the district courts of the state. The statute provided 
that, upon petition filed by a majority of real property owners of land lying 
within a city's limits praying that the land be disconnected from the city, 
a district court could, if it found the allegations of the petition to be true 
and if justice and equity required, issue a decree excluding the land from 
the city limits. Denying the contention that the district court in issuing 
such a decree was performing a legislative act, the Supreme Court said, 
"It is a judicial act to determine what the facts in a given case are, and 
whether such facts, when found, entitle the party to the relief sought." The 
Court admitted, however, that "it is not without doubt and difficulty that 
we have arrived at the conclusion" and cited decisions of other state courts 
contra. 
21 Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken, supra, p. 24. 
22 See the earlier case of United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 
u.s. (1950) 738. 
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project and to the overall objectives thereof. Con-
versely, a Btate cannot compel use of federal property 
on terms other than those prescribed or authorized by 
Congress." (357 U.S. at 294, 295). [Emphasis 
supplied.] 
No federal statute authorizes the relief which plaintiffs sought 
or the decree herein entered. On the contrary, the controlling 
laws of the United States have vested in the Secretary of the 
Interior all discretion to be exercised in the administration of 
the Strawberry Valley Irrigation Project. 
If the Court below, indeed, had power to enter the decree 
which it made, then the management of every federal reclama-
tion project could be taken over by a State court upon the 
filing of a single petition by any water user holding a contract 
with the United States for the delivery of project water.23 It is 
submitted that 43 U.S.C. § 666 could never have been intended 
to bring about such a result. Supra, pp. 22 to 27. 
Nor does Section 8 24 of the Reclamation Act authorize the 
decree that was entered or the relief which was sought. That 
law does not empower a State or the courts of a State to reg-
ulate in any way the operation of a federal reclamation 
project. This is clear from the following language of there-
cent Ivanhoe decision, supra, p. 24: 
As we read § 8 it merely requires the United States 
to comply with state law when in the construction and 
operation of a reclamation project, it becon1es neces-
sary for it to acquire water rights or vested interests 
23 This statement is in no sense hyperbole for the petition below did not 
seek an adjudication of water rights. but only a declaratory judgment based 
upon rights stemming from contract. 
24 The Section in its codified form reads as follows : 
"Vested rights and State laws unaffected by chapter. Nothing in this 
chapter ~hall be construE><l ns affE>cting or intended to affect or to in any 
way interfere with the laws of any State or Territory relating to the con-
trol, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation, or any 
vested right acquired then'under, and the Secretary of the Interior, in 
carrying out the provi'sions of this chapter, shall proceed in conformity 
with such laws, and. nothing herein shall in any way affect any right of 
any State or of the Federal Government or of any landowner, appropriator, 
or user of water in, to, or from any interstatE> stream or the waters there-
of" 43 u.s.a. § 383 
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therein. But the acquisition of water rights must not 
be confused with the operation of federal projec.ts. 
As the Court said in Nebraska v. Wyoming [325 U.S. 
589] * * * at 615: "We do nut suggest that where 
Congress has provided a system of regulation for fed-
eral projects it must. give way before an inconsistent 
State system." * * * We read nothing in § 8 that com-
pels the United States to deliver water on conditions 
imposed by the State. (357 U.S. at 291, 292.) 
The validity of this portion of the argument is even more 
apparent if it be supposed that the lower court had acted or 
been requested to act in pursuance of a Utah consti tu tiona! 
or statutory provision presuming expressly to authorize inter-
vention by the Utah court.sin the administration by the United 
States· and its authorized agents of federal reclamation proj-
ects. The complete ineffectuality of such an attempt by a 
State to regulate performance by the United Stakes of its con-
stitutional functions is demonstrated by a long line of de-
cisions of the Supreme Court of the United States ranging 
from McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (1819) through 
Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931), Federal Power 
Commission V; Oregon, 349, U.S. 435 (1955), and Public Utili-
ties Commission of California v. United States, 355 U.S. 534 
(1958), to the Ivanhoe case, supra. And see infra, pp. 41 to 
43. If the people of a state by constitutional or legislative 
fiat cannot so limit or regulate the operations of the United 
States, a fortiori the courts of a State cannot. 
(c) The decree of the Cour.t below substitutes the will of the Court for 
the will of the Secretary of the Interior, who is charged by law with 
responsibility for the operation of federal reclamation projects. The 
doctrine of separation of powers which precludes the court from promul-
gating a legislative regulation in the first place, also precludes it from 
assuming direction of the executive function 
The management, control and operation of federal reclama. 
tion projects are the responsibility of the Secretary of the 
Interior, 43 U.S.C. § 373. In the case of the Strawberry Val-
ley Irrigation Project, the Strawberry Water Users' Associa-
tion is his managing agent. The provisions of the contract 
executed by the United States and the Association in 1940 
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(Def. Ex. 49) not only show how close is his supervision of 
the affairs of the Association but, more importantly, the great 
extent to which control of the project is committed to his 
own discretion. 
As noted, supra, page 4, the 1940 contract requires the Asso-
ciation to operate the project, as well pursuant to the reclama-
tion law and the regulations of the Secretary made thereunder, 
as to its own terms (Article 14(b)). Many of these terms, 
now to be noted, appeared in substantially the same form in 
the 1926 con tract. 
Article 14(c) provides that no substantial change in any 
part of the project works shall be made by the Association 
without written consent first obtained from the Secretary. 
The Association must promptly make any and all repairs to 
project works deemed necessary "in the opinion of the Sec-
retary." Further, "If at any time, in the opinion of the 
Secretary" any part of the project works shall be unfit for 
service, he may order the water shut off until, "in his opinion", 
such works are put in serviceable condition. In case of neg-
lect or failure of the Association to make such repairs, the 
United States may, "at the option of the Secretary", take 
back the care, operation and maintenance of the project works, 
or cause the repairs to be made and charge the cost thereof 
to the Association, "which the latter agrees to pay." 
Article 14(d), most important of all to the purposes of this 
argument, deserves to he set out verbatim. It provides that 
"The Association shall make proper distribution and delivery 
of water to all parties entitled thereto in full accordance 
with the provisions of their contracts now and hereafter made 
and the reclamation law and the public notices and rules 
and regulations issued by the Secretary thereunder." 2li 
Article 14(£) provides that "The Association shall perform 
and carry out in accordance with their true intent and 1neaning 
211 It is to be empha~ized and reemphasized that by express provision of 
many, if not all, of the watE>r right application contracts. determination 
of the land owners' proportionate shares of "the water supply actually 
available * * * during the irrigation season for the irrigation of lands 
under" the various project units is to be made "by the Project Manager 
or other proper officer of the United States, or its successor in the control 
of the Project." Supra, pp. 3, 10. 
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and to the satisfaction of the Secretary, all obligations imposed 
upon the United States in all project contracts ... and shall 
not attempt in any manner to change any of the terms of any of 
said contracts without the consent of the Secretary." No con-
tract for the delivery of water made by the Association "shaH 
be valid until approved by the Secretary, and a draft of each 
such contract shall be submitted to the Secretary for approval 
as to form before execution." 
Article 14(g) provides that the Association shall: maintain 
"a modern set of books of account, to be acceptable to the Sec-
retary"; "furnish such financial reports and statements as ma.y 
be required from time to time by the Secretary" ; furnish to 
the Secretary each year "a reasonably accurate record of all crops 
raised and agricultural or livestock product-s produced on the 
project"; "keep for each year a careful and accurate record 
of the project water supply and the disposition of the same and 
furnish such detailed reports concerning the same as may be 
required by the Secretary"; and "keep and report such other 
records as the Secretary may require in the manner and form 
prescribed by him." 
Article 14 (h) provides that "The Secretary shall cause to 
be made from time to time a reasonable inspection of the proj-
ect to ascertain whether the terms of this con tract are being 
faithfully executed by the Association." Such inspection ex-
tends to anything connected with the project and the costs of 
it are to be borne by the Association even, be it noted, of in-
spection of documents relative to the project contained in the 
files of the Bureau of Reclamation. 
Article 17 requires the Association to employ a project man-
ager, an irrigation engineer, a power superintendent (the proj-
ect generates hydroelectric power), and an accountant. The 
article provides that "The selection of each of said persons shall 
be subject to the approval of the Secretary, and upon notice 
from the Secretary that any of said employees is or has be-
come unsatisfactory, the Association shall promptly, and as 
often as such notice is given, terminate the employment of such 
unsatisfactory employee and promptly employ one acceptable 
to the Secretary." 
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Article 18 provides that the Association may contract for 
the sale, lease or rental of project wat-er for the purpose of 
meeting its repayment obligations to the United States "sub-
ject to approval by the Secretary." 
Article 19 (e) requires the Association to pay, inter alia, "di-
rect costs for special work or services performed for the benefit 
of the project by the United States at the direction of the 
Secretary, and which in the opinion of the Secretary are for 
the use and benefit of the project." 
Article 21 provides that "all contracts for the sale or lease of 
power or power privileges shall be upon terms and conditions 
and at rates approved by the Secretary" and that "no addi-
tional capital investment in said power system shall be made 
by the Association unless and until approved by the Secretary." 
By Article 24 no transfer of water rights by the Association 
shall be effective until the contract effecting it is "approved 
in advance by the Secretary. The procedure to be followed in 
making any such transfer, and the terms and conditions of 
such transfer, shall be satisfactory to the Secretary." 
Article 33 prohibits assignment of any part or interest in the 
contract "until approved by the Secretary." 
Article 34 provides that if the Association defaults in its 
obligations "or is found by the Secretary to be operating the 
project or any part thereof in violation of the provisions of 
this contract, the United States may, at the election of the 
Secretary take back" the operation of "all or any part of" the 
project. "Notwithstanding any such resumption of operation 
and maintenance by the United States, all or any part of the 
property or works taken back by the United States may, at the 
election of the Secretary, be re-transferred to the Association 
* * *" During any time that the project works are being 
operated by the United States pursuant to this article, the As-
sociation shall pay in advance operation and maintenance 
costs "on the basis of estimates made by the Secretary and at 
such times as the Secretary shall direct." 
Finally, Article 35 provides that, in the event of disputes be-
tween the United States and the Associatjon as to questions 
of fact arising out of the contract, the decision of the Secre-
tary shall be conclusive and binding on the parties. 
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- The many powers reserved to the Secretary by the con tract 
and limited only by his discretion are specific instances of the 
wide authority conferred on the Secretary by Congress. It 
has been settled since the celebrated case of Marbury v. Madi-
son, 5 U.S. 137, was decided in 1803, that courts will not attempt 
to restrain the executive officers of the Government in the ex-
ercise of discretionary powers authorized by statute.26 In that 
case Chief Justice Marshall said: 
The province of the courts is, solely, to decide on the 
rights of individuals, not to inquire how the executive, 
or executive officers, perform duties in which they have 
a discretion. 
And see Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. 49'7 (1840). And 
where an officer of the Land Department has authority to per-
form a discretionary act "the courts have no power whatever 
under those circumstances to review his determination by man-
damus or injunction," Riverside Oil Co. v. Hitchcock, 190 U.S. 
316,325 (1902). 
Under the applicable statutes and the contracts which 
have been made, the matter of setting an equitable charge 
for the use of project river water is a discretionary matter 
for the Secretary. Further, even if it were not such per se-
which seems hardly tenable-any decision made in the matter 
inescapably affects the Secretary's discretion in managing the 
project water supply. If the setting of such charge were purely 
a ministerial matter, the decree below could have assumed the 
simple form of a direct command or mandatory injunction. 
The fact that it does not but instead promulgates arbitrary 
rates to be applied in futuro, and subject to change if experi-
ence proves them inequitable, is proof enough that the Court 
below regarded this setting of a charge as a discretionary mat-
ter. It is therefore only properly for the Secretary's consid-
eration. 
In a case involving other management problems of a federal 
reclamation project the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
20 
"It is a general rule that the courts are without power to interfere in the 
performance of executive duties, particularly where the executive must ex-
ercise discretion in the performance of constitutional or statutory powers." 
11 Am. Jur. 889, Const. Law, § 190, footnote 1; Ibid., p. 887, § 188. 
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fused to attempt control of the Secretary's actions in the fol-
lowing language: 
The necessity for drainage and the methods of con-
ducting work are, in our opinion, in the sound discretion 
of the Secretary of the Interior, and such discretion 
cannot be reviewed by the courts. (United States v. 
Ide, 227 Fed. 337, 382, affirmed 263 U.S. 497.) [Em-
phasis supplied.] 
Without exception the other Federal appellate courts west 
of the Mississippi have refused judicial control of the executive 
in the administration of federal reclamation projects. See 
Hudspeth County ConservaNon & Reclamation District No. 1 
v. Robbins, supra, p. 24; New Mexico v. Backer, supra, p. 24; 
Ogden River Water Users Association v. Weber Basin Water 
Conservancy District, supra, p. 27; United States v. United 
States District Court, supra, pages 31, 32. 
It is no less the job of the Federal executive departments 
to execute the Federal law than it is the job of Congress to 
write it. The functions differ but the authority to perform 
each is exclusive. The doctrine of separation of powers, which 
precludes the legislative branch from assuming to itself ex-
ecutive powers, Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 
(1927), also forbids the transfer of such powers to the judici-
ary. In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat [14 U.S.] 304 
(1816) Story says, "The second article declares that 'the ex-
ecutive power shall be vested in a president of the United 
States of America'", and .asks, "Could Congress vest it in any 
other person? * * * Such a construction," he says. "would 
be utterly inadmissible." Op. cit .. 329, 330. As Marshall 
had said earlier in Marbury v. 1lfadison, supra, page 41: 
The province of the court is. solely, to decide on the 
rights of individuals, not to inquire how the executive, 
or executive officers, perform duties in which they have 
a discretion. Questions * * • which are. by the con-
stitution and laws, submitted to the executive. can never 
be made in this court. 
* * * * * 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
43 
Where [as here] the head of a department acts in a 
case, in which executive discretion is to be exercised; 
in which he is the mere organ of executive will; it is 
again repeated, that any application to a court to con-
trol, in any respect, his conduct would be rejected with-
out hesitation. 
No one would doubt that, if paragraph 13 of the decree 
below had been drafted by Congress, it would have been an 
exercise of legislative power or, if by the Secretary of the Inte-
rior, an exercise of executive power. But it is not, because 
drafted by a court, the exercise of judicial power. Executive 
power is executive power inherently and not because of the 
source which attempts its exercise. It can be exercised neither 
by the legislature nor the judiciary. An exercise of executive 
power (as distinguished from the power itself) may be in-
distinguishable from an exercise of legislative power, as a regu-
lation from a law. This is because both lay down rules of 
conduct for the future. But in this respect both differ from 
an exercise of judicial power which, as Marshall put it, is 
"solely, to decide on the rights of individuals." 
Granted that Congress has directed the Secretary of the 
Interior "to comply with State law when, in the construction 
and operation of a reclamation project, it becomes necessary" 
to acquire water rights or vested interests therein ( 43 U.S.C. 
§ 383, Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. McCracken, supra, p. 24; 
United States v. Gerlach Livestock Co., supra, p. 35); and 
has permitted rights so acquired to be determined along with 
all other rights to the UJSe of water in a river system or other 
source (43 U.S.C. § 666, supra, part I). But Cong,ress has 
not provided that federal reclamation projects, or any part 
or aspect thereof, shall be regulated in any degree by the 
States or the courts of the States. As the Supreme Court of 
the United States said in the I V'anhoe case, supra, p. 24, "the 
acquisition of water rights must not be confused with the 
,operation of federal projects." 
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(d) The decree of the Court below makes new contracts for the parties. 
No court has power to do this 
In the preceding sections of this part of the argument, we 
have demonstrated that the decree of the Court below trans-
gresses established rules of public law. But it offends not 
less an established principle of private law in this, that it 
undertakes to make new contracts between the United States 
and its water users. To do this is the prerogative of the 
United States and its agents and the water users (infra, p. 
49). It is not a judicial function. 
We emphasize again the words of the Supreme Court of 
the United States, quoted supra at page 30: 
A court of chancery is not, any more than is a court 
of law, clothed with legislative power. It may enforce, 
in its own appropriate way the specific performance 
of an existing legal obligation arising out of contracts, 
law, or usage, but it cannot create the obligation. 
(Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe R.R. v. Denver & 
New Orleans R.R., 110 U.S. 667 (1883) ). 
All of the parties to this action have contracts with the 
United States with which the Court below could not inter-
fere and to which it could not add. This is no more than 
the general rule. "Interpretation of an agreement does not 
include its modifications or the creation of a new or different 
one. A court is not at liberty to revise an agreement while 
professing to construe it. Nor does it have the right to make 
a contract for the parties-that is, a contract different from 
that actually entered into by the1n. Neither abstract justice 
nor the rule of liberal construction justifies the creation of a 
contract for the parties which they did not n1ake themselves 
or the imposition upon one party to a contract of an obliga-
tion not assumed." (12 An1. Jur., Contracts, Sec. 228, 
page 749). 
If new rules are to govern the operation in any particu-
lar of the Strawberry Valley Irrigation Project. they n1ust 
come fron1 "some source of legislative powern and not from 
a court 1naking contracts for the parties. That is indeed in-
dicated in the following language of the Supren1e Court of 
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the United States, in The Express Cases, 117 U.S. 1, 28, 29 
(1896), so relevant here that it is unnecessary to set forth 
the facts of the cases it addressed: 
The difficulty in the cases is apparent from the form 
of the decrees. As express companies had always been 
carried by railroad companies under special contracts, 
which established the duty of the railroad company 
upon the one side, and fixed the liability of the ex-
press company on the other, the court, in decreeing 
the carriage, was substantially compelled to make for 
the parties such a contract for the business as in its 
opinion they ought to have made for themselves. Hav-
ing found that the railroad company should furnish 
the express company with facilities for business, it 
had to define what those facilities must be, and it 
did so by declaring that they should be furnished to 
the same extent and upon the same trains that the 
company accorded to itself or to any other company 
engaged in conducting an express business on its line. 
It then prescribed the time and manner of making the 
payment for the facilities and how the payment should 
be secured, as well as how it should be measured. Thus, 
by the decrees, these railroad companies are compelled 
to carry these express companies at these rates, and 
on these terms, so long as they ask to be carried, no 
matter what other express companies pay for the same 
facilities or what such facilities may, for the time being, 
be reasonably worth, unless the court sees fit, under 
the power reserved for that purpose, on the applica-
tion of either of the parties, to change the measure 
of compensation. In this way as it seems to us, "the 
court has made an arrangement for the business inter-
course of these companies, such as, in its opinion, they 
ought to have made for themselves," and that, we said 
in Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railroad Co. v. Den-
ver & New Orleans Railroad Co., 115 U.S. 587, could 
not be done. The regulation of matters of this kind 
is legislative in its character, not judicial. To what ex-
tent it must come, if it comes at all, from Congress, and 
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to what extent it may come from the States, are ques-
tions we do not now undertake to decide; but that it 
must come, when it comes, from some source of legis-
lative power, we do not doubt. 
IV. Plaintiffs failed to establish a cause of action against 
defendants and even though jurisdiction of the United 
States and the Secretary of the Interior were assumed, the 
trial court should have entered judgment dismissing the 
complaint 
We have shown why the Court below was without jurisdic-
tion to enter any decree in this case against the United States 
and the Secretary of the Interior, both indispensable parties. 
Alternatively, we have shown that even if jurisdiction of the 
United States and the Secretary be assumed, the decree entered 
is in excess of the power of the trial court. Finally, it is to be 
noted that even had the trial court limited its decree to granting 
the relief which the plaintiffs sought, such decree also would be 
erroneous.2'l 
What plaintiffs sought was a determination that by reason of 
the several contracts between the Secretary of the Interior 
and the water users of the Strawberry Valley Reclamation 
Project the Secretary of the Interior, and his agent, the Straw-
berry Valley Water Users' Association, are precluded from de-
livering to the defendant-type water users more water from the 
total project supply, including the Unit-ed St.ates' rights to the 
use of the waters of the Spanish Fork River, than their respec-
tive water-right application contracts expressly specify. The 
injury on which plaintiffs predicate their claim for such relief 
is a claimed diminution of the project supply of stored water 
as a result of the practice complained of to an extent greater 
than would occur if the defendant-type users were held to the 
27 In subdivisions (b) and (c) of Part III of the argument, we have noted 
that granting of the relief which plaintiffs sought is as much precluded, by 
the doctrine of separation of powers and the incapacity of the courts of a 
State to regulate the performance by the United States of its constitutional 
functions, ns is the legi'slative rule contained in the decree entered. And 
see also subdivision (b) of P'art I of the argument. Part IY of the argu-
ment is addressed to additional considerations in support of the proposition 
that the rPlief which plaintiffs expressly sought cannot be granted. 
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quantities expressly stated in their contracts and their uses of 
the project's supply of Spanish Fork River water were charged 
in full against those quantities. 
We submit that the evidence does not establish and the 
Court below did not find that the practice complained of re-
sults in a diminution of the supply of stored water av.ailable 
for satisfaction of the contract entitlements of the plaintiff-
type users. Certainly the statement in Finding 43 that "the 
purchasers of water under the irrigation systems of the plain-
tiffs herein may have been deprived of their right to the use of 
water to which they are entitled" is not .a determination that 
plaintiffs have suffered or will suffer injury by that practice. 
Neither is the statement in Finding 44 "That if [the defend-
ant-type users] are not charged with at least some of the water 
which they receive from the natural flow of Spanish Fork 
River -x- * * such .Procedure will [in some years] result in 
depriving the purchasers of water deliverable through the es-
tablished irrigation systems of a part of the water right which 
they have purchased." We submit that, on the contrary, the 
trial court's determination that continuation of that practice 
under the court's supervision is necessary in the interest of 
conservation of the project supply refutes conclusively injury 
to the plaintiffs as asserted by them. By its Finding 49 the 
trial court specifically determined: "That, if water users are 
charged for the full volume of water used from the river during 
said season of high water they will probably use substantially 
less of it, except in dry seasons, than if a smaller charge is 
made for its use. That this would result in heavier demands 
for stored water later in the season. A further result would 
probably be that a portion of such high water would flow into 
Utah Lake and be lost as project water." It was to provide 
against such loss that the Court assumed to itself the responsi-
bility of establishing a schedule of percentage charges for use 
of the early water.28 
28 Why the trial court assumed that it can with greater wisdom than the 
Secretary of the Interior and his authorized agent, or that it should attempt 
to, administer, conserve and distribute the waters the rights to the use 
of which belong to the United States for the use of this Federal project, 
we are unable to understand. The purpose sought to be accomplished by 
the decree is precisely the same as the purpose sought to be accomplished 
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The factual question here is whether the plaintiffs have been 
injured by the practice of which they complain. Does that 
practice result in less stored water for the plaintiff-type users? 
By its determination that the practice complained of should be 
continued, but under the court's supervision, the trial court de-
cided that that practice is less to the disadvantage of the 
plaintiff-type users, and to the entire project, than would be a 
practice of charging the defendant-type users against their 
contract entitlements with their full uses of the early river 
water. 
Moreover, we submit, the execution of water-right applica-
tion contracts such as those involved in the Strawberry Proj-
ect do not enable the landowners of the project to police the 
Secretary of the Interior in his exercise of the discretion with 
which he has been invested by Congress in making contracts 
with other project users or in administering the project water 
supply to the best advantage of the entire project. The prac-
tice about which plaintiffs complain would not constitute an 
invasion of any right of the plaintiffs even if the evidence 
established that to some extent the total water supply avail-
able for delivery to plaintiffs is diminished thereby. Should 
we be wrong in this assertion, however, the basic proposition 
that the Secretary of the Interior and his agents cannot be 
ousted from their administration of the project by grant of 
the relief which plaintiffs seek is not altered. Supra, Parts 
III (b) and III (c) of the argument. There can be no question 
of due process for, as noted in footnote 13, supra, if plaintiffs 
have suffered or should suffer any compensable injury, the 
courts are open for redress in a suit for con1pensation. 
by the practice of which complaint was made. We believe it is apparent 
on the face of the matter that the Secretary of the Interior and the Water 
Users' Association, authorized so to do by the laws of the United States, 
are better qualified than any court to make those determinations which 
necessarily must be made in administering a reclamation project water 
supply to the greatest benefit obtainable for the entire project. We believe 
further that the qualifications of the trial court to perform this function as 
compared to those of the Secretary of the Interior are not strene<>i:hened by 
the Court's designation as its agent for forecasting project supply the 
State Engineer of Utah instead of the Secretary's agent. That the Court 
is without power so to substitute its judgment in those matters for that of 
the Secretary we have already demonstrated. 
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It is further to be noted that there is nothing in any of the 
contracts which plaintiffs sought to have construed which pre-
cludes the practice complained of. Certainly not in the con-
tracts with the plaintiff-type users. And certainly not in the 
contracts with the defendant-type users. Granted that the 
Court below did find "That none of the applications contained 
any provision for any user to receive water from the project 
without being charged in full for the amount received" (Fdg. 
45). But from this omission, it did not conclude that the con-
tract provisions precluded the practice of making less than a 
full charge to the defendant-type users for the early river 
water used by them. On the contrary, it concluded "that the 
charge to be made should be adequate to properly protect the 
rights of other users under the project" (Conclusion 15). And 
by adoption for purposes of its own administration of the proj-
ect of the practice of making only a partial charge, it would 
seem clear that the trial court did determine that there is 
nothing in the provisions of any of the contracts with the 
water users inconsistent with or which prohibit that practice. 
But notwithstanding the terms of the water-right applica-
tion contracts between the United States and the water users, 
we know of no rule of law, statutory or otherwise, which pre-
vents the Secretary of the Interior, by himself or through his 
agent the Water Users' Association, from contracting sepa-
rately from year to year with such of the project landowners 
as may be willing to use the early river water for the use of a 
portion of that water in addition to their right to receive stored 
water later in the season. On the contrary, the physical situ-
ation existing with respect to the two components of the Straw-
berry Project water supply, as recognized by the trial court, 
dictates that such be done in the interest of the fullest and most 
beneficial use on the project of that supply. In effect, the prac-
tice of which plaintiffs complain amounts to the making of such 
annual contracts.32 
32 Of course, the problem which confronts the authorized agents of the 
United States in their administration of the project water supply with re-
spect to the defendant-type users does not exist with respect to the plain-
tiff-type users. They have no use for any part of the project supply of early 
river water. They get all of such water as they want under the rights 
thereto of the canal companies which serve them. Were they to utilize a 
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Thus, without regard to the suability of the United States 
and the Secretary of the Interior, the judgment of the trial 
court should be reversed and the plaintiffs' complaint should 
be dismissed for the additional reasons that (1) no right. of the 
plaintiffs and the water users whom they purport to represent 
which could be invaded by the practice complained of in ad-
ministration of the project water supply has been established, 
and (2) it has not been established that that practice in any 
way injures the plaintiffs or prejudices the availability of the 
project water available for satisfaction of their water-right ap-
plication contracts. On the contrary, the trial court has deter-
mined that such practice tends to conserve, rather than 
diminish, that supply. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted 
that the decree of the Court below should be set aside and 
the cause remanded to that Court with instructions to dismiss 
the action. 
PE:RRY w. 1\'lORTON, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
A. PRATT KESLER, 
United States Attorney, 
DAVID R. WARNER, 
ALFRED H. 0. BoUDREAU, Jr., 
Attorneys, Department of Justice. 
part of the project supply of river water, there is nothing to suggest that 
the charge to them on account of such use would be any different from 
that agreed to from year to year with the defendant-type users. 
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APPENDIX 
At footnote 9 and elsewhere in the foregoing brief, references 
are made to the legislative history of Section 666, 43 U.S.C. 
Additional excerpts from Senate Report No. 755, 82d Congress, 
1st Seseion, which are particularly pertinent to the consider-
ations presented, are as follows: 
Pages 4 and 5: 
It is most clear that where water rights have been 
adjudicated by a court and its final decree entered, or 
where such rights are in the course of adjudication by 
a court, the court adjudicating or having adjudicated 
such rights is the court possessing the jurisdiction to 
enter its orders and decrees with respect thereto and 
thereafter to enforce the same by appropriate pro-
ceedings. In the administration of and the adjudica-
tion of water rights under State laws the State courts 
are vested with the jurisdiction necessary for the 
proper and efficient disposition thereof, and by reason 
of the interlocking of a;djudicated rights on any stream 
system, any order or action affecting one right affects 
all such rights. Accordingly all water users on a stream, 
in practically every case, are in teres ted and necessary 
parties to any court proceedings. It is apparent that 
if any water user claiming to hold such right by reason 
of the ownership thereof by the United States or any 
of its departments is permitted to claim immunity 
from suit in, or orders of, a State court, such claims 
could materially interfere with the lawful and equitable 
use of water for beneficial use by the other water users 
who are amenable to and bound by the decrees and 
orders of the State courts. Unless Congress has re-
moved such immunity by statutory enactment, the bar 
of immunity from suit still remains and any judgment 
or decree of the State court is ineffective as to the water 
right held by the United States. Congress has notre-
moved the bar of immunity even in its own courts in 
(51) 
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suits wherein water rights acquired under State law are 
drawn in question. The bill (S. 18) was introduced for 
the very purpose of correcting this situation and the 
evils growing out of such immunity. 
Page 6: 
The committee is of the opinion that there is no 
valid reason why the United States should not be re-
quired to join in a proceeding when it is a necessary 
party and to be required to abide by the decisions of 
the Court in the same manner as if it were a private 
individual. 
Senator Magnuson raised the question as to whether 
S. 18 could be used for the purpose of delaying or 
blocking a multiple-purpose development such as pro-
posed for the Hells Canyon project on the Snake River 
in the Columbia Basin or other similar projects, stat-
ing that there w.as a possibility of an individual or 
group having water rights on that stream bringing suits 
to adjudicate their respective rights and therefore pre-
venting the Bureau of Reclamation from going ahead 
with the Hells Canyon project while litigation is in 
process or pending. The committee, for the legislative 
history of this bill, definitely desires to repudiate any 
such intent which may be deduced from S. 18 and states 
that this is not the purpose and the intent of this legis-
lation. ~There reclamation projects have been author-
ized for the benefit of the water users and the public 
generally, they should proceed under the law as it exists 
at the present time and should the Government have 
reason to need the water of any particular user on a 
stream, that water should be obtained by condemna-
tion proceedings as is already provided for by law. The 
committee can think of no particular reason why the 
mere development of a project should be delayed or 
stopped by the passa.ge of S. 18 and it is not so in-
tended. An exchang:e of letters by Senator Maoonuson 
and Senator McCarran dealing with this feature of the 
bill is hereto attached and made a part of this report. 
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Pages 9 and 10: 
Re 8. 18. 
Hon. PAT McCARRAN, 
Chair, Committee on the Judiciary, 
United States Senate. 
AuGUST 24, 1951. 
DEAR SENATOR: I am in agreement with the general 
purposes of S. 18. However, there is one possible impli-
cation in the bill that has caused me some apprehen-
sion and I take this means of achieving clarification 
before final action by our committee occurs. 
It appears to me that section 1 of the bill-although 
I am sure that is not the intent-might make it pos-
sible to block or delay a multiple-purpose development, 
such as proposed for the Hells Canyon projeet on the 
Snake River in the Columbia Basin. 
I visualize the possibility of an individual or group, 
having water rights on that stream, bringing suit to 
adjudicate their respective rights-thereby preventing 
the Bureau of Reclamation from going ahead with the 
Hells Canyon project while litigation is in process or 
pending. Such .action on the part of appropriators 
might be taken on their own initiative or might be 
stimulated by third parties who have been opposing this 
development. 
A similar set of circumstances might prevail with 
respect to other streams in the Basin. I will appreciate 
the benefit of your best judgment as to whether S. 18 
could be used in the manner I have described. I think 
clarification on this point will be extremely useful if 
made .a part of the legislative history of this bill. 
* * * * 
Sincerely, 
WARREN G. MAGNUSON, U.S.S. 
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Hon. WARREN G. MAGNUSON, 
United States Senate, Washington, D.C. 
MY DEAR SENATOR MAGNUSON: I was very pleased 
to receive your letter of August 24, 1951, relative to S. 
18, which provides for the joining of the United States in 
suits involving water rights where the United States 
has acquired or is in the process of acquiring water rights 
on a stream and is a necessary party to the suit. 
I note that you raise the question that it might be 
possible to block or delay a multiple-purpose develop-
ment, such as proposed for the Hells Canyon project on 
the Snake River in the Columbia Basin. You indicate 
that you visualize the possibility of an individual or 
group, having water rights on that stream, bringing suit 
to adjudicate their respective rights thereby preventing 
the Bureau of Reclamation from going ahead with the 
Hells Canyon project while litigation is in process or 
pending. 
S. 18 is not intended to be used for the purpose of 
obstructing the project of which you speak or any simi-
lar project and it is not intended to be used for any 
other purpose than to allow the United States to be 
joined in a suit wherein it is necessary to adjudicate all 
of the rights of various owners on a given stream. This 
is so because unless all of the parties owning or in the 
process of acquiring water rights on a particular stream 
can be joined as parties defendant, any subsequent de-
cree would be of little value. I agree with you that for 
purposes of legislative history, the report should show 
that S. 18 is not intended to be used for the purpose of 
obstructing or delaying Bureau of Reclamation projects 
for the good of the public and water users by the method 
of which you speak and in that··connection·· I propose 
that such a statement be incorporated in the report and 
that this exchange of letters be attached thereto. 
* * * * * 
Sincerely, 
PAT McCARRAN, Chairman. 
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1959 
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